The Fourth Amendment provides that the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” U.S. Const. amend. IV.
A “seizure” of one’s person occurs when a government actor terminates one’s freedom of movement through intentional means. Brower v. Cnty. of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596–97 (1989). The Supreme Court of the Unites States has established that when a police officer shoots a citizen, a Fourth Amendment seizure has occurred. Torres v. Madrid, 141 S.Ct. 989, 999 (2021). The Court held “[t]he officers’ shooting applied physical force to [Torres’] body and objectively manifested an intent to restrain her from driving away. We therefore conclude that the officers seized Torres the instant that the bullets struck her.” See also Tennessee v. Garner, where the Court held “[a]pprehension by use of deadly force is a seizure subject to the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment.” 471 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1985).
Some courts have held that a passenger or bystander is not seized when shot where the force was directed at the fleeing driver. In Landol-Rivera v. Cruz Cosme, 906 F.2d 791 (1st Cir. 1990), the court held that a fleeing hostage, who was shot by an officer’s errant bullet, did not state a Fourth Amendment claim because the officer did not intend to shoot the hostage. Id. at 795. In Childress v. City of Arapaho, Okla., 210 F.3d 1154 (10th Cir. 2000), the Tenth Circuit found the shots striking the hostages did not constitute a seizure because they didn’t satisfy the “intent” requirement of Brower.
While it is clear that a Fourth Amendment seizure occurs when a police officer shoots a citizen, the answer is less certain if that person is a “bystander” or a “hostage” or an innocent party.
The Fourth Amendment provides that the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” U.S. Const. amend. IV.
A “seizure” of one’s person occurs when a government actor terminates one’s freedom of movement through intentional means. Brower v. Cnty. of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596–97 (1989). The Supreme Court of the Unites States has established that when a police officer shoots a citizen, a Fourth Amendment seizure has occurred. Torres v. Madrid, 141 S.Ct. 989, 999 (2021). The Court held “[t]he officers’ shooting applied physical force to [Torres’] body and objectively manifested an intent to restrain her from driving away. We therefore conclude that the officers seized Torres the instant that the bullets struck her.” See also Tennessee v. Garner, where the Court held “[a]pprehension by use of deadly force is a seizure subject to the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment.” 471 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1985).
Some courts have held that a passenger or bystander is not seized when shot where the force was directed at the fleeing driver. In Landol-Rivera v. Cruz Cosme, 906 F.2d 791 (1st Cir. 1990), the court held that a fleeing hostage, who was shot by an officer’s errant bullet, did not state a Fourth Amendment claim because the officer did not intend to shoot the hostage. Id. at 795. In Childress v. City of Arapaho, Okla., 210 F.3d 1154 (10th Cir. 2000), the Tenth Circuit found the shots striking the hostages did not constitute a seizure because they didn’t satisfy the “intent” requirement of Brower.
While it is clear that a Fourth Amendment seizure occurs when a police officer shoots a citizen, the answer is less certain if that person is a “bystander” or a “hostage” or an innocent party.